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Abstract  
Recent empirical studies on stock misvaluation as a possible determinant of 
mergers are inconclusive concerning the central hypothesis that 
over(under)valuation is negatively (positively) associated with merger 
announcement returns in stock mergers, but not in cash mergers. We provide 
empirical support for this hypothesis. In contrast to prior research, we employ a 
two-stage model to account for endogenous mergers and suggest an alternative 
specification of misvaluation based on an asset-pricing model (bidder momentum). 
In the first stage, we specify panel logit models to predict U.S. mergers from 1981 
to 2003 and find that bidder momentum triggers stock mergers, but not cash 
mergers. In a second stage, we regress cumulated abnormal returns on merger 
probabilities to control for the endogeneity of mergers. This reveals a lower market 
response for stock mergers compared to cash mergers, which we identify as market 
correction of misvalued acquirers. 
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1. Introduction 
One central assumption common to all versions of market driven merger models is 
that – at least partially – past stock returns stimulate mergers. Recent models by 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) (SV model) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) 
(RKV model) propose that the decision to merge is influenced by prior stock 
misvaluation.
1
 Alternatively, Harford (2005) advances a more neoclassical 
explanation, which is based on the finding that industrial shocks can trigger merger 
activity (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001). 
According to Harford (2005), high stock valuations are associated with high macro-
level capital liquidity, which may trigger cash and stock mergers even if underlying 
industry shocks do not stimulate mergers.  
Testing the validity of the misvaluation approach versus neoclassical 
explanations hinges on the stock market‟s abnormal reaction to the announcement of 
stock mergers compared to cash mergers. In line with Myers and Majluf (1984), the 
RKV model predicts that markets should correct acquirer‟s valuation downwards 
when overvalued stock is used, but not when cash is used as method of payment. 
Interestingly, recent evidence reports a negative relation between overvaluation and 
merger announcement returns for both stock and cash mergers (Dong et al., 2006). 
This is counter-intuitive and neither fully supported by misvaluation models of RKV, 
or Myers and Majluf (1984), nor by Harford (2005) capital liquidity explanation.
2
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 Similar theoretical models assert that other important managerial decisions are also endogenously 
influenced by market returns, e.g. seasoned equity offerings (Lucas and McDonald, 1990). 
2
 The SV model does not imply any correction of misevaluation, as stock markets are assumed to be 
inefficient. In the long run, valuation levels converge to a „standard‟ valuation level. 
 3 
We suggest that the endogeneity in market driven mergers could be a reason 
for some of the empirical ambiguity. Event studies that account for the endogeneity of 
mergers showed negative returns regardless whether mean cumulative abnormal 
returns or buy and hold returns were used (Schultz, 2003; Viswanathan and Wei, 
2004). Viswanathan and Wei (2004) provide formal proof that the expected event 
abnormal return is negative when returns predict events and that this bias increases 
with the length of the holding period. The intuition behind is that if high returns imply 
more events in the future, the denominator of the mean abnormal return over the 
cross-section of events is greater, effectively underweighting the high return period. In 
addition, Viswanathan and Wei (2004) find that a dependence of events on returns 
increases the confidence interval and lowers the power of conventional significance 
levels. Thus, without accounting for this dependence, statistically significant findings 
of a negative relation between announcement returns and prior valuations may falsely 
support the misvaluation approach instead of a more neoclassical explanation, as 
advanced by Harford (2005). 
In this paper, we attempt to control for the effects discussed above by 
specifying a two-stage model that accounts for the endogenous probability to merge. 
In the first stage, we specify panel logit models to predict U.S. mergers from 1981 to 
2003. Applying an asset-pricing model, we control for fundamental changes in 
acquirers‟ stock returns and interpret the remaining effect as bidder momentum that 
may include mispricing. As there is no consensus on the measurement of mispricing, 
we resort to this (novel) approach, which is the most practical measure in our setting. 
In the second stage, we regress cumulated abnormal returns on the merger 
probabilities that were predicted by bidder momentum and other control variables. 
 4 
With the inclusion of this probability to merge, we are able to correct for the potential 
negative bias of endogenous mergers. 
Our study complements the existing literature on market driven mergers in 
three ways: first, by explicitly controlling for endogenous decisions to merge, our 
results point more clearly into the direction predicted by the misvaluation approach, 
specifically the RKV model. In contrast, Dong et al. (2006) find a highly significant 
negative relations between acquirers‟ announcement returns and overvaluation, 
measured as price to residual income value (derived from Ohlson, 1995). Although 
this tends to be in support of the misvalution approach, they find this for stock as well 
as for cash mergers. In our two-stage analysis, we do not detect such a negative 
association of acquirers‟ stock returns with cash merger announcement returns, 
although we can confirm such a relation for stock mergers. However, in line with 
Dong et al. (2006), we also find that the impact of mispricing is limited to certain 
periods (specifically to the post-1989 period).  
Second, within the misvaluation literature our study may also serve as a test 
between the two most prominent theoretical explanations, the SV and RKV model. 
The SV model takes stock overvaluation as a given and argues that shareholder value 
maximizing acquirers with long-term horizon and opportunistic target managers with 
short-term interests have an incentive to exchange relatively overvalued shares to the 
disadvantage of target shareholders, who finance the deal by overpaying for cheap 
equity issued by the acquirer. As investors are assumed to be temporarily irrational, 
they do not perceive or correct asset overvaluation in the short-term when a market 
driven merger is announced. In contrast, RKV propose a model of endogenous 
mispricing, where fully rational participants with imperfect information make errors 
in valuing potential merger synergies. If these errors are correlated with overall 
 5 
market misvaluation, changes in merger activity and in the means of payment can be 
driven by over-and undervaluation. As RKV‟s investors are rational Bayesian 
updaters, they are expected to adjust overvalued stock downwards and undervalued 
stock upwards when market driven mergers are announced that are paid for in stock or 
cash respectively. Corrected for endogeneity, our results favor RKV‟s notion of 
rational investors that make mistakes, as we find that a negative relation between 
acquirers‟ past returns and the market reaction to stock mergers, but not to cash 
mergers.  
Third, our main results from the panel logit show that bidder momentum 
increases the likelihood of stock mergers, but not that of cash mergers. This supports 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) and Ang and Cheng (2003), who 
provide similar evidence for different measures of mispricing. However, Harford 
(2005) reports an increase not only in stock mergers but also in partial-firm cash 
acquisitions. This seems to be contradictory: while stock mergers are predicted by the 
misvaluation approach, an increase in cash mergers is more consistent with 
neoclassical explanations. One explanation could be that the effects are varying over 
time, which makes them hard to detect in more aggregated data. By analyzing 1978-
1989 and 1990-2000 subperiods, Dong et al. (2006) conclude that their “evidence is 
broadly supportive of both the Q and misvaluation hypotheses in both periods, but 
tends to be more supportive of the Q hypothesis in the 1980s, and of the misvaluation 
hypothesis in the 1990s.” Hence, during the 1980s firms with high Tobin‟s Q acquired 
targets with low Q, which might led to efficiency gains, whereas in the 1990s 
overvaluation drives mergers. Our results show that both approaches have little 
predictive power in the 1980s, as mergers were mainly driven by firm size and 
industry momentum. In the 1990s, bidder momentum explained stock mergers - but 
 6 
cash mergers were mainly driven by industry momentum and the availability of cash 
(high equity-debt ratio and high operating cash flows relative to total assets). 
Macroeconomic shocks can drive both cash and stock mergers – but the partial 
impacts vary over time. 
We interpret this result as support for another explanation, which includes the 
impact of economic shocks. At the industry level, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) ran an 
empirical horse race between their misvaluation proxies and Harford‟s (2005) 
macroeconomic variables and concluded that both factors play a role: while economic 
shocks could well be fundamental drivers of merger waves, misvaluation affects who 
buys whom, as well as the method of payment. Our results corroborate this finding at 
the firm level. Shocks in the economic variables generally affect the likelihood of 
both stock and cash mergers, while the impact of bidder momentum is restricted to 
stock mergers only. This goes beyond the general notion that both approaches explain 
merger activity and beyond the prediction that overvaluation determines the bidder in 
stock mergers. Our results suggest that both approaches can coexist without 
contradicting each other. Possibly sparked off by exogenous shocks, neoclassical and 
market driven forces affect merger activity in a similar way, although channeled 
through different means of payment. Based on these considerations, we formulate two 
research questions. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: Bidder momentum and mergers 
We measure bidder momentum, which is defined as firm‟s unexpected stock return 
controlling for macroeconomic shocks and cross-sectional differences based on an 
asset-pricing model. Stock market and industry momentum are also considered in our 
 7 
panel logit models. If we find that bidder momentum triggers stock but not cash 
mergers, we confirm the SV model.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: Market correction of bidder momentum 
We control for the endogeinity of mergers by using the probability to merge as 
explanatory variable. The RKV model suggests that overvaluation is corrected by the 
market after merger announcements. Hence, if we find a negative market response for 
stock mergers that were endogeneously determined by bidder momentum and hence 
exhibit a high merger probability, we can identify market correction of overvalued 
acquirers. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: section two explains the methodology, 
construction of variables and data, specifically the measurement of bidder momentum. 
Section three describes the empirical analysis and our results, and section four 
concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Measuring bidder momentum  
To capture individual mispricing on the firm level, we define bidder momentum, 
which measures the deviation of firm‟s stock return from fundamental values. To 
estimate fundamental asset prices for large samples, we use the arbitrage pricing 
model (APM) of Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and apply a four-factor model based on 
Fama and French (1996) and Carhart‟s (1997) momentum factor to capture cross-
sectional differences in stock returns. 
 
 8 
The APM is based on the notion that stock prices reflect all available 
information and that changes are due to exogenous shocks or „innovations‟ in 
underlying factors. Compared to statistically inferred but less interpretable factors 
from a factor analysis, the use of macroeconomic variables does not compromise the 
predictive ability of the model (Chen and Jordan, 1993). In fact, an advantage of 
factors with an economic meaning is that Chen et al. (1986) specification corresponds 
remarkably well with a number of variables that prior studies identified as 
determinants for mergers. Thus, to isolate the misvaluation of bidders, we need to 
control for these factors in our asset-pricing model. In line with the economic shock 
hypothesis for merger waves our asset pricing model includes changes in term spread 
as shocks in capital liquidity (Harford, 2005), supply shocks in oil prices (Mitchell 
and Mulherin, 1996), and overall market return as market momentum (Rosen, 2006), 
but also as a second proxy for capital liquidity. 
We use the same set of variables as in the arbitrage-pricing framework of 
Chen et al. (1986) and compute expected and unexpected changes of these variables 
by exploiting serial dependencies. The Box-Pierce statistic can reject its null 
hypothesis that the series of macroeconomic variables is white noise.
 3
 Consequently, 
innovations in these time series can be partly anticipated. Using partial autocorrelation 
functions, we can identify the order of AR(p) processes for every time series and 
predict innovations based on past observations. Unpredicted innovations are defined 
as actual values minus expected values conditional on previous knowledge. 
Accordingly, we compute the following macroeconomic variables: unexpected 
changes in oil price (u_oil), unexpected changes in industry production (u_ip), and 
                                                 
3
 Note that all macroeconomic variables are first-differenced (in the case of the market index, oil prices 
and industrial production we calculated log-returns) to ensure their stationarity. 
 9 
unexpected term structure (u_ts), which is defined as spread, namely the difference 
between ten-year government bonds and the three-month Treasury bill rate. To 
determine predicted and unexpected inflation rates (p_i, u_i), we use the consumption 
price index. The unexpected risk premium (u_rp) is the difference between the 
average yield of Aaa ranked (rated by Moody‟s) corporate bonds and Baa ranked 
corporate bonds. To account for the market momentum, we insert the market return 
(ret_mkt), which refers to the S&P 500 index.  
Apart from macroeconomic shocks, our asset-pricing model also embeds 
Fama and French‟s (1996) three-factor model, which considers market returns 
(ret_mkt) and cross-sectional differences in stock returns due to firm size and market 
valuation differences. Accordingly, we construct portfolios of the largest and smallest 
firms (top and bottom 5%) in every month and determine the average stock return of 
both portfolios. The difference in stock returns between large and small firms 
comprises the firm size effect (ret_size). Similarly, we construct the stock return 
difference of the highest and lowest stocks in terms of market valuation using book-
to-market as valuation measure (ret_value). Carhart (1997) extended the three-factor 
model by including the past stock market returns to account for momentum effects. 
Finally, bidder momentum (ret_acqit) of firm i at time t is defined as firm‟s stock 
return (returnit) minus the expected stock return based on our asset pricing model that 
embeds macroeconomic shocks, cross-section differences in stock returns due to firm 
size and valuation levels and stock market momentum. Therefore, the bidder 
momentum is the residual of the asset-pricing model and reflects deviations from 
fundamental values.  
 10 
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2.2 Why is bidder momentum a good measure for misvaluation? 
The current discussion about the most appropriate proxy for mispricing is far from 
resolved: a number of studies use value to market (VM) proxies (Dong et al., 2006; 
Ang and Cheng, 2003), where residual income models serve as a fundamental value 
benchmark to current market valuations in the denominator. Unfortunately, the VM 
measure often reduces the sample size considerably (see e.g. Ang and Cheng, 2003), 
as it is very demanding with regard to the availability of accounting data. 
Viswanathan and Wei (2004) show that this issue is problematic because the biasing 
effects of endogeneity are especially sensitive to sample size. Thus, if we want to 
study large cross sections over longer time horizons, VM is not a measure of choice.
4
  
A frequently used alternative measure, book-to-market (BM), is highly 
debatable (see Dong et al., 2006; Ang and Cheng, 2003; Alti, 2006). In contrast to 
VM, where the numerator explicitly captures growth opportunities, BM mixes growth 
and possible misevaluation effects in the denominator. In addition, both proxies, BM 
and VM, are typically not mean-reverting,
5
 which makes it hard to detect the time-
                                                 
4
 Besides the availability of accounting data, figures need to be adjusted to reflect the actual operations 
of a firm (e.g. operating leases). Proper adjustments need to be done on a firm-by-firm basis and thus 
require a substantial amount of time. 
5
 Hence, both time series are non-stationary and have to be either used in first differences, which 
reduces the degree of information, or incorporated into a cointegration framework, which is commonly 
not done. 
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varying pattern of misvaluation. In fact, Chen and Dong (2001) find that above 
(below) average BM stocks tend to maintain above (below) average BM ratios, even 
after five years.
6
  
As there is no consensus on measuring mispricing, we resort to the most 
practical measure in our setting. It should be a measure that avoids small sample 
problems and is sensitive to time-varying misvaluation. Thus, in conjunction with a 
time sensitive asset-pricing model that predicts changes in fundamental values, the 
remaining bidder momentum captures abnormal changes that cannot be explained by 
the asset-pricing model (see equation 1). Of course, we are aware of the inherent joint 
hypothesis problem that any predictability pattern we find may not reflect market 
inefficiency, but flaws in our asset-pricing model. Comparing the time-series 
properties of book-to-market (BM) and the bidder momentum (ret_acq) reveals that 
bidder momentum exhibits mean-reversion, whereas BM does not seem to be 
stationary. To illustrate the time-series properties, we ran two autorgressions with one 
lag, which showed that lagged values of book-to-market explain current book-to-
market almost perfectly indicated by an adjusted R-squared of 92%. In addition, the 
coefficient of the lagged BM is in the 95% confidence interval of 1.004 to 1.006, 
which stresses the non-stationarity of this measure. In contrast, lagged bidder 
momentum does not explain current bidder momentum shown by an adjusted R-
squared of only 0.05%. As we try to explain the timing of acquisitions, a „sticky‟ 
measure like BM does not seem to be a good indicator for mergers, whereas a time-
varying measure like bidder momentum could explain timing decisions.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 This stickiness of BM underlines the non-stationary nature of the time series. 
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2.3 Additional control variables 
In addition to macroeconomic shocks as used in our asset-pricing model, we also 
compute several firm specific variables that could influence merger behavior. 
Following Manne (1965) and the so-called Q-theory of mergers (Jovanovic and 
Rousseau, 2002), firms with high Tobin‟s Q signal superior management performance 
and growth prospects, which make it possible to acquire and turn-around less 
successful targets. In such a market for corporate control, ceteris paribus higher 
returns lead to mergers, simply because they are a symptom of comparative 
advantage, but not of overvaluation. Accordingly, we include book-to-market (BM), 
which is often used as a proxy for Tobin‟s Q and for expected growth or managerial 
effectiveness. Certainly, we cannot exclude that BM also captures some effects of 
misvaluation. However, if BM filters out information about growth, then residual 
effects that may be captured by bidder momentum (ret_acq) are likely to be not 
related to growth, which is our primary intent at this point. In addition, our asset-
pricing model captures cross-section differences in stock returns due to differences in 
book-to-market. Moreover, if we find bidder momentum to be significant, then this is 
an overly stringent test, because controlling for BM is likely to remove part of the 
misvaluation effect that we seek to measure.
7
 As collinearity between the two 
variables does not bias the estimation (Wooldridge, 2003), we therefore rather accept 
that the influence of misvaluation is (falsely) inferred as statistically insignificant, 
than risk a possible bias due to omitted variables (e.g. related to growth). 
As we analyze mergers by means of payments, bidders‟ cash flow also is a 
variable of interest. Companies with high cash flows could use internal sources of 
                                                 
7
 This argumentation follows Bhagat et al. (2005), who extensively discuss the issue of BM as a 
measure of growth in combination with variables of misvaluation. 
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finance to conduct more acquisitions, which is in line with Jensen and Ruback's 
(1983) free cash flow hypothesis. We therefore control for operating cash flows 
relative to the book value of total assets (CF). Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) 
defined as common equity relative to total long-term debt indicates financial strength 
and borrowing capacity, which might be relevant for merger decisions. Since 
economies of scale and market power might drive mergers, acquirers‟ market 
capitalization (SIZE) serves as a proxy of size and related benefits. To incorporate the 
diminishing marginal benefits of size, we take the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization.
8
 To distinguish between different types of misvaluation on the market, 
industry and individual level, we use stock market returns (ret_mkt) and determine the 
median stock return for every industry (ret_ind) based on the three-digit SIC level. To 
illustrate our industry classification based on SIC codes, consider the industries 2033 
(canned fruits, vegetables, preserves, jams, and jellies) and 2034 (dried and 
dehydrated fruits, vegetables, and soup mixes), we use the first three digit of the SIC 
code and would group these two sub-industries into the industry canned food.  
 
2.4 Announcement-period returns 
Ang and Cheng (2003) show that, once the pre-merger wealth effects of overvaluation 
are taken into account, the long-run wealth effects of overvalued stock acquirers are 
not necessarily lower than those of similarly overvalued but non-acquiring control 
firms.
9
 Thus, when we incorporate pre-merger bidder momentum into our first-stage 
                                                 
8
 We also used sales as proxy and relative figures, like sales divided by the average sales in the 
respective industry. These alternative measures exhibited similar coefficients and are highly correlated. 
9
 In fact, using BM as an overvaluation proxy, Ang and Cheng (2003) show that a subsample of stock 
acquirers, whose overvaluation is greater than their targets‟ premium adjusted overvaluation, are able 
to realize long-run wealth gains. 
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estimation, long-run abnormal returns might not enable us to trace the effects of 
mispricing anymore. Following Dong et al. (2006), we therefore focus on the market‟s 
immediate reaction and compute the short-term cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 
the bidder around the announcement of the merger. We use standard event study 
procedures (Brown and Warner, 1985) to calculate market model abnormal returns 
with the S&P500 index and an estimation interval from -200 to -40 days before the 
event. Daily return data (closing prices) are taken from Thomson Datastream. For 
robustness, we use different observation windows to estimate acquirers‟ abnormal 
returns. CAR(-5,+5) denotes a 11-day observation window around the announcement, 
CAR(-2,+2) is associated with the five-day window surrounding the event, and CAR(-
1,0) is the abnormal return on the announcement day only. 
 
2.5 Sample and descriptive statistics 
Our merger sample contains successful acquisition announcements from Thomson‟s 
SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. The sample of acquisitions meets the 
following criteria: (1) the acquisition is announced from 1981 to 2003. (2) Acquirers 
hold less than 50% of target shares at announcement and more than 50% after 
consummation. (3) The deal value is equal to or greater than USD 1 million. (4) 
Acquirers and targets are U.S. public firms, either independent or publicly quoted 
subsidiaries. (5) Acquirers did not announce a self-tender or any other kind of 
repurchase. (6) Acquirers have Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes outside 
the ranges 9111-9999 (public administration; unspecified) and 6000-6999 (financials). 
As explained in the previous subsection, we compute several firm-specific and 
macroeconomic variables, which are included in the sample. Accounting data and 
stock data is available from Thomson Worldscope and Thomson Datastream 
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respectively, and the NBER provides macroeconomic data. To construct a panel, we 
retrieve monthly data for all bidders and for all economic variables for the period 
from 1981 to 2003. After deleting the cases for which not all data were available, the 
final sample consists of 6991 mergers. Consequently, the firms included in our sample 
conducted at least one acquisition during the investigation period; hence, our logit 
model tries to explain the underlying reasons for the timing of cash and stock mergers. 
To illustrate our explanatory variables, Table 1 reports the mean and standard 
deviations (in parentheses) of firm characteristics and macroeconomic shocks for 
four-year sub periods. Table 2 reports the pair wise correlation coefficients of 
macroeconomic shocks and firm characteristics. The coefficients are very low; thus, 
multicollinearity is not present. 
(Insert Table 1) 
(Insert Table 2) 
Table 3 reports equally weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) abnormal 
returns for the full sample and for different methods of payment. While the equally 
weighted (EW) CARs are not significantly different from zero, the value-weighted 
(VW) abnormal returns are significantly negative. When we differentiate between the 
means of payments, bidders‟ CARs of stock (cash) mergers are significantly negative 
(non-negative). These results generally correspond to prior studies with regard to both 
the effects of the means of payment (Andrade et al., 2001) and the negative impact of 
bigger deals in the VW measure (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz., 2005). Thus, we 
are not concerned that our data differ from previously published analysis 
substantially. 
(Insert Table 3) 
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3. Analysis and results 
3.1 First stage: bidder momentum and merger activity 
In line with prior research at a more aggregated level (see Harford, 2005), we model 
the probability to merge with panel logit models. We study merger decisions (mit) of 
individual firms (indexed i) on a monthly basis (indexed t). The dependent variable in 
Equation 2 is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the firm i announced a 
successful bid for a target in month t, and zero otherwise.  
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(2) 
The first explanatory variable is bidder momentum (ret_acq) as defined in 
equation 1. To control for macroeconomic shocks, as specified by Chen et al. (1986), 
we insert expected inflation (p_i), which is related to current nominal interest rates, 
unexpected shocks in inflation (u_i), term spread (u_ts), risk premium (u_rp), 
industrial production (u_ip), and oil prices (u_oil). Furthermore, we control for stock 
market returns (ret_mkt), and for several firm-specific characteristics, like book-to-
market ratios (BM), firm size measured (SIZE), operating cash flow relative to total 
assets (CF), and financial leverage defined as equity-debt ratio (LEVERAGE).
10
 
Median stock returns within an industry (indexed j) measure the industry momentum 
(ret_ind) based on three-digit SIC codes. Therefore, we distinguish between 875 
industries and calculate the median of monthly stock returns of firms in the respective 
industry. This measure reflects stock market performance on the industry level due to 
industry-specific effects (e.g. valuation, momentum) as described in the RKV model. 
By using bidder momentum (ret_acq), industry momentum (ret_ind) and stock market 
                                                 
10
 For a more detailed explanation and motivation of the variables employed, see the preceding section. 
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returns (ret_market), our model can disentangle bidder, industry and market 
momentum and its impact on the timing of stock and cash mergers.   
Note that all explanatory variables are lagged by one month to ensure weak 
exogeneity. By construction, macroeconomic shocks are weakly exogenous and 
predictions are based on the information set in the previous month. Since merger 
activity exhibits a pronounced time pattern, it is helpful to decompose the analysis of 
market driven mergers into several sub periods. While Dong et al. (2006) study two 
sub periods, namely 1978-1989 and 1990-2000, our sample is large enough to 
estimate shorter sub periods. Several unreported estimations show that the optimal sub 
period length, which allows for enough observations within a sufficient amount of sub 
periods, is about 48 months (four years).  
(Insert Table 4) 
Table 4 summarizes our results for stock and cash mergers and shows that 
bidder momentum triggers stock mergers since 1989 – but does not explain cash 
mergers. This finding suggests that bidders with high stock returns not explained by 
fundamentals as captured by an asset-pricing model (see equation 1) are more likely 
to announce a stock merger in the following month. Hence, individual misvaluation – 
the deviation of bidder‟s stock return from the fundamental value – causes stock 
mergers, which is in line with the SV model. Industry momentum (ret_ind) measured 
by the median stock return within an industry is an important driver of stock and cash 
mergers – but stock market returns do not affect the probability to merge, which 
stresses the importance of industry-specific stock returns. Accordingly, the market can 
drive stock and cash mergers if the whole industry exhibits an upswing, which 
supports the RKV model. Nevertheless, individual misvaluation measured by bidder 
momentum determines the method of payment. 
 18 
Apart from misvaluation and industry momentum, firm size (SIZE) is a 
consistent driver of stock and cash mergers. Interestingly, our measures for financial 
strength – financial leverage (LEVERAGE) and operating cash flows relative to total 
assets (CF) are important drivers for cash mergers – but not for stock mergers. Firms 
with high equity to debt ratios (LEVERAGE) find it easier to finance an acquisition 
by cash. A high operating cash flow to total asset ratio (CF) indicates good sources of 
internal finance, as projects including acquisitions can be financed by operating cash 
flows from exciting operations.  
Macroeconomic shocks have an impact on stock and cash mergers, albeit the 
partial impacts are not consistent over time. This finding underlines that 
macroeconomic shocks might cause merger activities – but macroeconomic variables 
cannot be used to forecast merger activities, as the coefficients are time varying. 
Furthermore, by observing macroeconomic shocks, one cannot assess whether stock 
or cash mergers are more likely. 
(Insert Table 5) 
Bidder momentum is not just a significant explanatory variable for stock 
merger, as shown in Table 4, it is also a reliable indicator for timing decisions, as it 
exhibits a distinct time pattern before merger announcements. To illustrate this point, 
Table 5 shows the number of stock and cash mergers and the associated average 
bidder momentum (ret_acq), industry momentum (ret_ind) and market stock returns 
(ret_mkt) one month prior to the merger announcement. Motivated by our finding that 
bidder momentum only influences stock mergers in the post-1989 period (see Table 
4), we divide our investigation period into the pre and post-1989 period. Interestingly, 
in the pre-1989 period bidder momentum does not exhibit any distinct time pattern 
before merger announcements. In this period, industry momentum drove stock and 
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cash mergers highlighted by the significant partial impact of industry returns 
uncovered by the panel logit models (see Table 4). The pattern changes in the post-
1989 period, as bidder momentum preceding stock mergers reaches on average 1.99% 
and has not just a statistically significant effect on stock mergers as shown in the 
panel logit model – but also an economically relevant effect in that the magnitude of 
deviation from fundamental values is considerable. 
 
3.2 Second stage: merger probability and market reaction 
While an external shock may influence merger performance within or across 
industries, we do not expect to detect significant differences between cash and stock 
mergers. In the absence of misvaluation, an economic shock should lead to similar 
reactions on cash and stock merger announcements, mainly determined by the general 
nature of the exogenous influence. In contrast, mergers that are endogenously 
determined by bidder momentum as shown in the panel logit models (see Table 4) are 
likely to produce distinct differences in abnormal returns, because the decision about 
the means of payment is at least partially related to the motivation to merge. Thus, for 
stock mergers in particular, we would expect to see significantly lower announcement 
returns in the second stage regression when bidder momentum affected the likelihood 
of the merger in the first stage. In contrast, for cash mergers we do not expect to 
observe such a market response, for bidders‟ misvaluation does not influence cash 
mergers. As individual overvaluation is not present, the market does not need to 
correct acquirers‟ market value.  
To test this hypothesis, we use the panel logit model (see Table 4) to predict 
the merger probability of each firm in our sample. As the CARs are not defined for 
calendar times, we use one pooled dataset for the whole period. Equation 3 specifies 
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the regression model where the bidder‟s CAR is explained by the first-stage merger 
probability (MRG_PROB), book-to-market (BM), cash flow (CF) and relative size 
(RS), defined as deal value divided by acquirers‟ market capitalizations. Furthermore, 
we control for industry-specific effects (3-digit SIC level) using dummy variables. 
1 2 1 2 1 3 1 4 1( , ) _j it it it it itCAR MRG PROB BM RS CF                    
(3) 
(Insert Table 6) 
Table 6 reports the OLS regression results for eleven- (1=-5; 2=5), five- (1=-
2; 2=2) and one-day (1=-1; 2=0) CARs of merger announcements. As expected, the 
predicted merger probability has a significantly negative effect on the cumulated 
abnormal returns of stock mergers based on five and one-day event windows. In 
contrast, the market reaction to cash mergers is unrelated to the probability to merge 
for all three CARs, clearly indicating that the announcement prompts no correction of 
previous bidder momentum. This finding is intuitive because bidder momentum did 
not trigger cash mergers in the first place. Based on Equation 3, we can assess the 
relevance of endogeneity for measuring merger performance in the case of stock 
mergers. The 95% confidence interval of the CAR(-1, 0) is in the range from -11.1% 
and 8.2%. Yet, the 95% confidence interval of residual values of CAR(-1, 0) after 
controlling for the probability to merge is considerably smaller and limits the 
downside of market reactions, namely from -9.4% to 8.2%. The median of CARs(-1, 
0) is -0.1%, whereas the residual value of abnormal returns exhibits a median of 0.2%. 
Hence, controlling for endogeneity, which is mainly due to prior bidder momentum, 
uncovers that the negative market reaction is mainly caused by past misvaluation. 
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4. Conclusion 
Bidder momentum, namely unexplained high acquirers‟ stock returns prior to merger 
announcements, predicts stock mergers but not cash mergers, which highlights that 
acquirers‟ overvaluation triggers merger decisions. Accordingly, we confirm that 
bidder‟s valuation can cause stock mergers, which is in line with the SV model. 
Controlling for industry momentum defined as the median of stock returns within an 
industry and for stock market returns, we confirm that industry momentum triggers 
stock and cash mergers, which supports the RKV model. Hence, our empirical 
findings reveal that mergers were market driven. In particular, industry momentum 
can enhance the probability of stock and cash mergers, whereas bidder momentum 
only increases the likelihood of stock mergers. Apart from market-driven factors, firm 
size fosters merger activity, and macroeconomic shocks stimulate mergers; however, 
the partial impacts are time varying. Bidder-specific financial strength in terms of 
high equity to debt ratios and high operating cash flows to total asset ratios facilitate 
cash mergers.  
One limitation of the SV model is that stock markets are assumed to be 
inefficient and thus overvaluation is not corrected by investors. In contrast, the RKV 
model suggests that rational investor correct for overvalued acquirers. We show that – 
in line with market-driven merger models – bidder momentum can trigger stock 
mergers but not cash mergers. Using predicted merger probabilities, we reveal that 
market reactions are negative if the merger is predictable in the case of stock mergers 
– but we cannot detect any impact of merger probabilities on market reactions in the 
case of cash mergers. Consequently, investors realize that acquirers were overvalued 
before the merger announcement and they correct their mistake by adjusting market 
values downwards.  
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 In addition, we show that the impact of endogenous merger events on 
cumulated abnormal returns is considerable suggesting that endogeneity biases the 
results of standard event studies heavily. Henceforth, embedding endogeneity of 
merger events into event studies seems to be crucial to measure announcement effects 
correctly. This finding supports previous results of Schultz (2003) and Viswanathan 
and Wei (2004). In fact, the commonly perceived negative market response after stock 
merger can be explained largely by overvaluation of acquirers prior to 
announcements. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for firm characteristics and macroeconomic shocks 
 1981-
1984 
1985-
1988 
1989-
1992 
1993-
1996 
1997-
2000 
2001-
2003 
BM 0.556 0.428 0.346 0.338 0.467 0.533 
 [4.012] [3.318] [3.250] [3.359] [5.492] [8.547] 
SIZE 5.059 5.436 5.689 6.019 6.190 6.360 
 [1.926] [2.058] [2.266] [2.541] [2.756] [2.726] 
CF 0.108 0.105 0.088 0.083 0.027 0.024 
 [0.093] [0.103] [0.120] [0.143] [1.347] [0.574] 
LEVERAGE 0.766 0.811 0.994 0.927 1.038 1.375 
 [2.333] [2.623] [3.434] [3.452] [3.565] [4.471] 
p_i 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
u_ts -0.812 -0.031 0.080 -0.020 0.446 -0.067 
 [6.053] [0.141] [0.415] [0.158] [2.442] [0.258] 
u_rp -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.003 0.007 
 [0.106] [0.070] [0.059] [0.057] [0.072] [0.107] 
u_i 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
u_ip -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] 
u_oil -0.004 -0.012 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.002 
 [0.025] [0.070] [0.077] [0.055] [0.087] [0.072] 
Note: We report means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for different sub 
periods.
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Table 2. Correlation matrix of macroeconomic variables and firm characteristics 
  p_i u_ts u_rp u_i u_ip u_oil BM SIZE CF LEVERAGE 
p_i 1.000          
u_ts -0.107 1.000         
u_rp 0.012 -0.009 1.000        
u_i -0.183 -0.003 -0.137 1.000       
u_ip -0.165 -0.088 -0.060 0.073 1.000      
u_oil -0.086 -0.018 -0.049 0.318 -0.010 1.000     
BM -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 1.000    
SIZE -0.059 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 -0.003 1.000   
CF 0.018 -0.006 -0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.402 0.041 1.000  
LEVERAGE -0.015 0.005 0.002 -0.001 -0.006 0.004 -0.002 0.331 0.009 1.000 
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Table 3. Abnormal acquirer returns and method of payment 
Variable Weight Payment Mean Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
CAR(-1,0) EW ANY 0.0020 0.0013 -0.0005 0.0045 
CAR(-2,2) EW ANY 0.0018 0.0056 -0.0092 0.0128 
CAR(-5,5) EW ANY -0.0041 0.0104 -0.0245 0.0162 
CAR(-1,0) VW ANY -0.0048*** 0.0005 -0.0058 -0.0038 
CAR(-2,2) VW ANY -0.0076*** 0.0010 -0.0095 -0.0057 
CAR(-5,5) VW ANY -0.0153*** 0.0014 -0.0181 -0.0126 
CAR(-1,0) EW STOCK -0.0066** 0.0026 -0.0116 -0.0015 
CAR(-1,0) EW CASH 0.0052** 0.0019 0.0015 0.0090 
CAR(-1,0) VW STOCK -0.0110*** 0.0013 -0.0135 -0.0085 
CAR(-1,0) VW CASH -0.0010 0.0005 -0.0019 0.0000 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 4: Panel logit models for stock and cash mergers 
 Panel A:  Stock mergers           
 All years 1981-1984 1985-1988 1989-1992 1993-1996 1997-2000 2001-2003 
ret_acq 0.689*** 3.136 -0.701 1.060* 0.769* 0.719*** 0.508* 
ret_mkt 1.095 8.446 -3.705 -0.906 6.449** 1.650 1.018 
BM -0.014 -0.757 -0.104 0.012 -0.061 -0.075 0.000 
SIZE 0.115*** 0.648 0.343*** 0.228*** 0.102*** 0.090*** 0.035 
CF -0.012 1.181 -0.218 -0.437 0.121 0.022 -0.010 
LEVERAGE -0.006 -0.170 -0.034 -0.038 -0.082** 0.010 -0.004 
ret_ind 25.284*** 99.104 -0.806 58.569*** 44.491*** 19.366* 19.643 
p_i -259.946*** -97.550 266.731* -45.300 -230.258 40.616 11.660 
u_ts 0.084*** 0.078 -0.020 -0.276 0.239 0.035** -0.119 
u_rp 0.807** -0.556 -1.044 0.588 0.886 0.662 1.352** 
u_i -10.232 -74.649 -73.901 24.198 7.289 40.475 53.223 
u_ip 2.642 -29.851 -2.887 6.913 4.401 2.542 11.924 
u_oil 0.082 11.408 0.948 -0.341 -0.038 0.075 -0.684 
constant -6.022*** -13.231*** -9.568*** -7.847*** -5.951*** -6.084*** -6.008*** 
N 634000 59056 77006 94489 139000 165000 97345 
aic 25084 157 1460 2278 6216 10253 4306 
bic 25243 283 1589 2410 6354 10394 4439 
  Panel B: Cash mergers           
 All years 1981-1984 1985-1988 1989-1992 1993-1996 1997-2000 2001-2003 
ret_acq 0.167 -3.551** -0.203 -0.270 0.176 0.272 0.201 
ret_mkt -0.076 3.134 -3.240** 4.496* -2.889 -0.221 1.449 
BM -0.050*** -0.107 -0.007 -0.049 -0.011 -0.048* -0.185* 
SIZE 0.156*** 0.308 0.340*** 0.221*** 0.123*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 
CF 0.243*** -1.258 -0.95 -0.055 1.359*** 0.613*** 0.181*** 
LEVERAGE 0.013*** 0.071 0.017 0.023*** 0.012* 0.012* 0.009 
ret_ind 47.929*** 116.718* 44.515*** 42.795*** 57.929*** 51.865*** 38.022*** 
p_i -178.337*** -32.153 -92.942* 61.144 305.644** -132.232** 87.367 
u_ts 0.025** 0.079 -0.828* 0.010 -0.114 0.014 0.114 
u_rp 0.028 -1.858 -0.767 -0.019 0.138 -0.198 0.197 
u_i -16.778* -50.628 45.433 39.731 65.113* -1.953 -7.549 
u_ip -3.594 8.812 -11.4 0.991 5.756 3.268 -4.58 
u_oil 0.456* -6.923 -0.067 0.453 0.354 0.412 2.116*** 
constant -5.565*** -10.305*** -6.935*** -6.831*** -6.569*** -5.236*** -5.628*** 
N 634000 59056 77006 94489 139000 165000 97345 
aic 58653 365 6315 7767 13845 18611 10994 
bic 58812 491 6444 7900 13983 18752 11127 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 5. Bidder momentum and the timing of mergers 
  Stock mergers Cash mergers No mergers 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Panel A: Pre-1989 
ret_acq 114 0.61% 619 0.64% 171351 0.57% 
ret_ind 114 0.32% 620 0.41% 172171 0.26% 
ret_mkt 114 0.18% 620 0.60% 172171 0.80% 
Panel B: Post-1989 
ret_acq 1909 1.99% 4926 0.73% 565476 -0.19% 
ret_ind 1918 0.32% 4951 0.38% 568008 0.24% 
ret_mkt 1918 1.20% 4951 1.03% 568003 1.00% 
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 Table 6. Endogenous mergers and market reactions 
  Stock mergers   Cash Mergers   
  CAR(-5,5) CAR(-2,2) CAR(-1,0) CAR(-5,5) CAR(-2,2) CAR(-1,0) 
MRG_PROB -0.091 -3.325* -3.197** -0.852 -0.627 -0.438 
BM -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
RS 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CF -0.062** -0.042* 0.012 0.423* 0.235* 0.016 
constant -0.004 0.005 0.002 -0.038 -0.014 0.007 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
